ABSTRACT Due to the advantages of low handover latency and signaling costs, Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6), as a localized mobility management protocol for next generation mobile network, can be well combined with vehicular ad-hoc networks. However, the lack of security considerations limits the rapid growth of PMIPv6. Unfortunately, few proposals are in the literature to address such issue. Motivated by this, a novel authentication scheme based on identity-based signature for PMIPv6 is proposed. Mutual authentication between mobile node and mobile access gateway is achieved for both intra-domain and interdomain scenarios with the help of identity-based signature and service-level agreement. The authentication signaling can be finely integrated into the mobility management procedure of PMIPv6, which equips our scheme with high authentication efficiency. The formal security proof under SVO logic and the performance analysis are presented to demonstrate the robustness and efficiency of our proposed scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of transportation and wireless network has greatly promoted the popularization of vehicular adhoc networks(VANETs). MIPv6 protocol [4] , which allows mobile node to be online regardless of its movement and location, is an ideal protocol applied to vehicular ad-hoc networks [5] . However, MIPv6 also faces many problems such as security, efficiency, package loss. Therefore, several enhanced schemes are introduced including HMIPv6 [6] , FMIPv6 [7] , and PMIPv6 [13] , where PMIPv6 has the lowest handover delay and configuration requirement that gains more attentions from researchers and practitioners consequently.
Reliable wireless communication is essential demands for VANETs [14] , without safety, it is impossible for PMIPv6 to be widely adopted as a network-based mobility management protocol in VANETs. According to [15] , [16] , there are various attacks including stolen-verified, denial of service, impersonation, replay, password guessing, as well as man-in-the-middle attack, which threat the PMIPv6 network seriously. It is worth to note that RFC5213, a specification for PMIPv6, doesn't provide details for authentication and other security concerns.
To the end, experts proposed some security scheme for PMIPv6. Zhang et al. [17] present an authentication scheme based on certificateless signcryption, and the use of signcryption scheme ensures the confidentiality, reliability during message interaction process. Zhang and Wuhan [18] utilize the improved scheme of IBC to realize the secure handover of MN, which can solve the key escrow problem effectively. Reference [19] is a Diameter based on PMIPv6 authentication scheme. During authentication process, each entity implements authentication by using sharedkey with the AAA server and guarantees the security of the key. However, in [17] - [19] , MNs need to be authenticated by their home authentication server(AS), which causes much burden for the home AS. In order to solve these problems, Kim and Lee [20] propose an authentication scheme, which is based on the DiffieHellman key. However, this scheme suffers from the latency of session key generations, which clearly influences the handover efficiency. On the other hand, SPAM [21] presents a secure password authentication mechanism by using smart card to store relevant information, which has the advantage in terms of security and efficiency. But, from [22] , [23] , we can see that SPAM still has critical security flaws. HOTA [34] proposes a ticked based on authentication scheme. Using the same credential issued by AS, no matter where MN is located, HOTA can achieve authentication. However, during initial authentication, the credential has to be ensured by AS which increases transmission overhead.
In this paper, we propose a PMIPv6 access authentication scheme based on identity-based signature in VANETs. Mutual authentication between MN and MAG is achieved for initial authentication without knowing the other party's identity. At the same time, the design of hierarchical architecture decreases the pressure of System-level Trust Root (STR) and Local Mobility Anchor (LMA), shortens MN's waiting time and improves the whole authentication efficiency. The formal security proof under SVO logic and the performance analysis show that the proposed scheme can maintain a balance between efficiency and security well.
The rest of this paper is organized in the following manner. The related theory and cryptography building blocks are reviewed in Section 2. The proposed scheme is established in Section 3. The security and performance analysis are given in Section 4, and Section 5 respectively. Finally, we get a conclusion in Section 6.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. VANETs
As shown in Figure 1 , VANETs is a special mobile ad hoc networks(MANETs) which can guarantee the Vehicle-to-vehicle(V2V) communications, and Vehicle-toInfrastructure(V2I) communications. Due to the device equipped with computing capabilities, positioning, communicating, etc., the vehicle has the ability to sense its own driving data, perform message broadcasting and forwarding to neighboring nodes. RSU is seen as a gateway to connect internet and vehicles, each vehicle can obtain internet services through RSU. As the part of the intelligent transportation system(ITS) in Smart Cities [8] , vehicle can avoid congested road, ensure the security of driving through message broadcasting and forwarding. Meanwhile, RSU can collect vehicle status information, obtain traffic status of the road, and assist in supervising road conditions [9] . Beside, by combining with the socially aware networking and Internet of Things, VANETs can also provide diverse application services for drivers [9] - [12] .
B. PMIPv6
In 2008, PMIPv6 was proposed as a network-based mobility management protocol [13] . PMIPv6 introduces two new entities, Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) and Mobile Access Gateway (MAG). In Figure. 2, MAG executes on an access router and is responsible for tracking MN's mobility status, handling the mobility-management signaling on behalf of MN, which decreases the complexity of MN's protocol stack. LMA, acting as a home agent of MN, is responsible for managing binding status of MN and establish the bi-directional tunnel to forward packages.
The whole access process of MN contains initial access phrase and handover access phrase. The initial access phrase is that MN conducts the binding registration of PMIPv6 when entering the PMIPv6 domain firstly. The handover access authentication is that MN changes its access point or user interface when roaming in the PMIPv6 domain. In initial access phrase, when MAG detects MN's access, it can obtain MN's configuration files which contains user's ID, service provider's ID, and LMA's address. Then, MAG sends Proxy Binding Update (PBU) to LMA on behalf of MN. After receiving the PBU, LMA sends Proxy Binding Acknowledgement (PBA) with MN's home network prefix to MAG and establishes a bi-directional tunnel with MAG. Meanwhile, LMA also establishes a binding cache entry (BCE) to store MN's relevant registration information. After receiving PBA, MAG sends Router Advertisement (RA) to MN and informs MN its Home Network Prefix (HNP). MN is then able to configure its formal IPv6 address using the HNP and obtain the VOLUME 6, 2018 network service through the bi-directional tunnel. During the handover access phase, when MN changes its access point, the previous MAG (pMAG) can detect MN's departure. At the same time, pMAG sends PBU to LMA for cancelling MN's binding status. LMA replies PBA to pMAG and releases the bi-directional tunnel between pMAG and LMA. Afterwards, MN is able to access to the new MAG (nMAG) with the same manner of initial access phrase.
C. BILINEAR PAIRING
Let G 1 be a cyclic additive group generated by P, whose order is a prime q, and G T be a multiplicative group of the same prime order. I G T is the generator of G T . Assume that the discrete logarithm problem [25] • WMS.ParaGen -Input the system parameter l, the private key generators(PKG) generates a bilinear group G 1 of prime order q, bilinear pairing e:
where G T is a multiplicative group of the same prime order q, a generator P of G 1 . PKG selects a master key s ∈ Z * q randomly and computes P Pub = sP as the public key. At the same time, PKG chooses two different secure hash functions H 0 , H 1 : {0, 1} * − → G 1 . The system public parameters are {G 1 , G T , q, e, P, P Pub , H 0 , H 1 }.
• WMS.KeyExtract -For the given string ID ∈ {0, 1} * , PKG generates the user private key sk ID = sH 0 (ID).
• WMS.StandardSign -In order to sign message M ∈ {0, 1} * , the signer selects r ∈ Z * q , and signs M as:
• WMS.StandardVerify -In order to verify the signature Sign, the verifier checks whether e(δ 1 , P) == e(H 0 (ID), P pub )e(H 1 (M ), δ 2 ) holds. If the equation holds, the signature is valid, otherwise, the signature is invalid.
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME A. HIERARCHICAL NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we provide a scenarios that VANETs and PMIPv6 are combined. As depicted in Figure 3 , The first layer is the System-level Trusted Root (STR) that is trusted by all entities, is in charge of issuing the private key for other entities. The second layer includes several LMAs. As an auxiliary entity of VANETs, LMA is responsible for managing binding status of MN and establishes the bi-directional tunnel to forward packages. Besides, LMA also provides registration and authentication service for MAGs. The third layer contains MAGs which is integrated with RSU and is deployed on both sides of the road to provide authentication, security communications and other related services for MN. The forth layer is formed by MNs, which refer to vehicle nodes. MN can rely on the infrastructure deployed on the roadside to access the network and communicate, besides, during driving, MN can switch from one network or subnet to another, and ensure the stability of the communication.
B. TRUST MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
The trust model is shown as Figure. Generally, TA, LMA, and MAG are difficult to be compromised and if MN is compromised, the communication among entities has not been greatly affected. Thus we assume a global passive attacker existed who owns the common attack capabilities, such as impersonation, replay, etc. 
C. THE ACCESS AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
The proposed PMIPv6 access authentication scheme in vehicular scenarios(PAAS) is composed of four phrases: registration, initial access authentication, intra-domain handover authentication, and inter-domain handover authentication.
For the convenience of the later description, the relevant notations and descriptions are shown as Table 1 .
1) REGISTRATION
Before registration, STR generates a bilinear group G 1 of prime order q, a bilinear pairing e:
where G 1 is a multiplicative group of the same prime order q, and a generator P of G 1 . STR selects a master key SK STR ∈ Z * q randomly and computes its public key PK STR = SK STR P. At the same time, STR selects three secure hash functions
where l is the length of the session key. The system public parameters are {G 1 , G T , q, e, P, P pub , H , H 0 , H 1 }.
a: MN's REGISTRATION
As shown in Figure. 5, MN's registration process is composed of the following steps.
(1) MN generates the shared key K MN −STR ∈ {0, 1} * and random number N 1 ∈ Z * q . MN uses PK STR to 
2) INITIAL AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
The initial authentication protocol works when MN first attaches a PMIPv6 domain and launches mutual authentication with the accessed MAG. The detail of initial authentication protocol is shown as Figure. 7 in terms of the scenario in Figure. 3.
(1 Finally, MAG 1 generates the shared key and session key: 
D. INTRA-DOMAIN HANDOVER AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
Intra-domain handover take place when MN detaches from the previous MAG(MAG 1 ) and is ready to attach the new MAG(MAG 2 ) in the same LMA domain as shown in Figure3. According to the FPMIPv6 protocol [28] , MN has the ability to report the link layer information to the Access Network (AN). Afterwards, AN relays the handover indication to MAG 1 . In Figure. 8, when MN detects that a handover is imminent, it forwards ID MN and New Access Point Identifier ID n−AP [7] When MN is ready to attach the new MAG (MAG 2 ), the Intra-domain handover authentication process between MN and MAG 2 is shown as Figure.9 .
(1) MN derives the signature Sign MN = Sign_HMAC
, where σ MN _2 = r MN P. 2 and if the verification is successful, MN will generate the shared key and the session key:
. Otherwise, the authentication failed and the authentication process stops.
E. INTER-DOMAIN HANDOVER AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOL
During Inter-domain handover, MN departs from MAG 2 to MAG 3 which locates in another LMA domain (LMA 2 ) as shown in Figure.3 3 , if it is invalid, the process stops. Otherwise, MN finishes the mutual authentication and computes the shared key and the session key:
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SCHEME
In this section, we will provide formal security proof of the authentication protocols in PAAS through SVO Logic. Besides, the security analysis of PAAS from the aspects of mutual authentication, session key secrecy, reliability, as well as the resistance of man-in-middle attack will also be presented.
A. SVO LOGIC SVO logic [29] is a security protocol analysis method proposed by Syverson and Orschot,which absorbs the advantages of BAN logic [30] , GNY logic [31] , AT logic [32] , VO logic [33] . SVO logic has clear semantic, high expansion capability, and is easy to use.
SVO logic owns two basic inference rules and twenty axioms.
1) Inference rules: a) Modus Ponens(MP
2) Axioms a) Believing Ax1: P believes ϕ∧ P believes (ϕ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ P believes ψ Ax2: P believes ϕ ⊃ P believes (P believes ϕ) b) Source Association Ax3: According to P5, S3, Ax1, Nec: S4: MAG 3 believes PK δ (MN, σ MN _2 ) S18: MN believes fresh(K MN −MAG 1 ) (G 9 is proved)
C. FURTHER SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we continue to analyze the security features that PAAS satisfies.
1) MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION
The mutual authentication is to guarantee the identity of the other entity during MN's accessing procedure. In initial authentication, MN and MAG can confirm the other entity's identity by verifying the WMS signature. During handover authentication, MN and MAG uses HMAC algorithm to sign and verify the signatures which ensures the legitimacy and authenticity of the other entity.
2) SESSION KEY SECRECY
After authentication protocol is achieved successfully, the confidentiality of the message between MN and MAG is necessary. Thus, it is important that the session key is unknown by the adversary. In other words, during the session key negotiation, adversary cannot get the session key by monitoring the communication between MN and MAG. In PAAS, the session key is generated by DH key exchange approach [34] , the adversary couldn't get the session key only by monitoring the key negotiation parameters, which guarantee the session key secrecy.
3) RELIABILITY
During initial access authentication, because there is no way to obtain the legal private key via STR for the adversary, he couldn't generate legal signature and be verified as a legitimate entity. In handover authentication, the shared key between MN and MAG 1 or MAG 2 is only transmitted in the secure tunnel, the adversary does not have chance to attain the shared key and generate HMAC signature to take part in authentication process.
4) RESISTANCE OF MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE ATTACK
When a man-in-the-middle attack occurs, the adversary can modify, forge or reply the message MN and MAG. Once the message is modified or forged, when the legal verifier authenticates the signature or HMAC, the result will be failure. If reply attack happens, the verifier will find the timestamp is not fresh, which results the authentication is failed.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we conduct performance analysis by comparing the proposed scheme (PAAS) with HOTA [34] , CSS [17] . In most instances, MN executes handover authentication, thus our analysis will be focus on the handover authentication in terms of handover authentication latency, communication overhead, and signaling cost. Before the analysis, the relevant notations, descriptions, and the execution time are shown in Table 2 [35], [36] .
A. HANDOVER AUTHENTICATION LATENCY
The handover authentication latency(HL) refers to the time interval from MN sending the first authentication request message to the trust relationship being built between MN and MAG in handover authentication protocol, which contains the computation cost of each entity and the message transfer latency. VOLUME 6, 2018 
During the intra-domain handover authentication of PAAS, MN computes the signature as: Sign MN 
We assume D MN −MAG =20(ms), D MAG−AAA =35(ms) [34] . According to (1)-(3), the result of handover authentication latency is shown as Figure. 11, and we can get the conclusion that PAAS owns the superiority in handover authentication latency. 
B. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD
The communication overhead(CO) is the size of total message transmitted during handover authentication. According to [37] , [38] , the size of corresponding parameters are shown as table 3. HOTA and CSS have no concern of building session key, thus we ignore relevant session key parameters.
In 
Compared with HOTA and CSS, the proposed PAAS owns lower communication overhead as shown in Table 4 .
C. SIGNALING COST
The signaling cost is defined as the entire amount of authentication signaling costs. We adopt the fluid-flow model [39] to analyze the signaling cost. In this model, it is assumed that all the subnets are circular and of the same size. MN's movement direction is distributed in the range of (0, 2π ). The crossing rate(R) and signaling cost (SC) can be derived as (4) and (5):
Where ρ is the density of MN, v refers to the average velocity of MN, and L means the perimeters of a cell. we assume L=100m, the wired bandwidth is 10Mbps, the wireless bandwidth is 6Mbps. According to Table 2 , as the processing time of symmetric key algorithm is about thousands of times faster than the other operations, we ignore the execute time of HMAC, AES-256 encryption and AES-256 decryption. The results are shown as Figure. 12 where we can draw the conclusion that PAAS owns lower signaling cost than the other two schemes.
VI. CONCLUSION
Guaranteeing access authentication and communication security between vehicles and RSUs is the basis for VANETs. Due to shorter signaling overhead and lower handover delay, PMIPv6 can be well combined with VANETs. In this paper, we propose a secure access authentication scheme for PMIPv6 in VANETs(PAAS). Identity-based signature is finely integrated into our hierarchical architecture to achieve distributed mutual authentication between MN and MAG. Security proof under SVO logic is made to prove the robustness of the primary authentication protocols in PAAS. The performance analysis and results demonstrate that PAAS is efficient both for Intra-domain and Inter-domain authentication.
In our further work, we will try to address the privacy-preserving issue during the access authentication of PMIPv6 based on the proposed scheme in this paper.
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